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depoLiticiZAtioN 
ANd the chiNese 
iNteLLectuAL 
sceNe
Alexander day 
the end of the revolution: china 
and the Limits of modernity 
by Wang hui. New york: Verso, 
2009. pp. xxxiii, 274. $26.95 cloth.
it is not easy to construct a Left 
critique in china today. one has 
to work hard both to differentiate 
oneself from the socialist past— 
especially the contentious period 
of the cultural revolution—and 
to critique the capitalist present. it 
is much easier to fall into a liberal 
position of maintaining an opposi-
tion between the market and what 
is considered civil society, on one 
side, and the socialist state, on the 
other. Wang hui, one of the stron-
gest critics of contemporary in-
equality and the marketization of 
society and politics in china, argues 
against the ideological separation 
of the market and the state that has 
undergirded much of chinese in-
tellectual discourse since the 1980s. 
this argument is forcefully made 
in the end of the revolution, a 
new english-language collection 
of his essays published by Verso. 
the book is a difficult read because 
the thread linking its essays is not 
always clear; they cover a broad se-
ries of topics and were written over 
more than a decade. But its diffi-
culty also stems from the complex-
ity of Wang’s intellectual project 
and the particular politics that he 
has worked to construct. 
Wang hui’s intellectual trajec-
tory cannot be understood apart 
from the development of intel-
lectual politics in china since the 
1980s, when his academic career 
began and his involvement in the 
1989 tiananmen democracy move-
ment shaped his political outlook. 
the post-mao chinese intellectual 
scene of the 1980s was dominated 
by a progressive narrative of tradi-
tion and modernity, in which the 
West was the modern standard and 
china was forced to catch up. in-
tellectuals saw themselves as agents 
of a new enlightenment, and mao-
ism was seen as an offspring of au-
thoritarian chinese feudal tradi-
tion based in a conservative peasant 
mentality. Breaking with tradition 
meant converging with the West. 
the reform-period liberalism that 
emerged at the time imagined this 
process as a liberation of society 
from the state, with the freedom of 
the market determining the mea-
sure of that liberation. this was 
always an elite process in which 
intellectuals and radical reformers 
in the communist party were to 
engineer the transformation and 
guard against populist backlash—
with the specter of a violent and 
chaotic cultural revolution always 
a present fear. While there were 
debates over how this process was 
to unfold and what the best policies 
were to speed its progress, this nar-
rative remained hegemonic within 
the chinese intellectual scene until 
the 1990s and the emergence of the 
New Left critique, of which Wang 
hui was a central figure. 
As he outlines in chapter 4, it 
was in the repressive years imme-
diately following 1989 that Wang, 
who was banished to shaanxi for 
a year in punishment for his par-
ticipation in the movement, began 
to develop his major, four-volume 
work of intellectual history, the 
rise of modern chinese thought 
(2004)—discussed in several essays 
in the Verso collection.1 in that in-
tellectual history, finally published 
in chinese in 2004 and yet to be 
translated into english, Wang re-
jected the teleological and progres-
sive narrative of history of the 1980s 
and its key dichotomies of china/
West, state/society, and empire/na-
tion, transforming the dichotomy 
tradition/modernity in the process. 
For Wang—and this marks the key 
divergence of the New Left from 
the liberals in the 1990s—the 1980s 
narrative of enlightenment acted 
as an ideological veil, concealing 
the repressive link between market 
reforms and the postrevolution-
ary state. instead of celebrating the 
present moment as a break from 
the feudal state, with the market 
playing the role of a modernizing 
and progressive agent, according 
to Wang it is the role of intellectu-
als to critically tear away the ideo-
logical veil that conceals the hidden 
connection between the market 
and the repressive state, revealing 
a present in which the market and 
capital dominate the social world. 
the rise of modern chinese 
thought attempts to open up his-
tory as a nonteleological process, 
full of reversals and contingencies. 
ranging across chinese history, 
with a focus on the period from 
the song dynasty (960–1279) to the 
twentieth century, Wang argued 
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that china had its own modernity 
that offered resources for con-
structing a society different from 
that of the capitalist West. in doing 
so, Wang hoped to break down the 
ideological thinking that constricts 
present political construction and 
to open up avenues to new pos-
sible futures. Wang’s reading of 
song confucian debates provides 
a model of intellectual critique, as 
well as itself serving as a critique of 
anachronistic and universalizing 
narratives typically used to discuss 
the song. Wang is not the first to 
trace modernity to song china. 
Japanese scholars of the Kyoto 
school, writing from the 1920s to 
the 1940s, believed that song bu-
reaucracy and markets signaled a 
modern break from the preceding 
aristocratic tang dynasty. they 
constructed a universalizing and 
teleological narrative in which 
china had the potential to con-
verge with the West. For the Kyoto 
school, the dichotomy of empire/
nation-state was key to understand-
ing this transformation: the song 
was an early form of nation-state. 
What differentiates Wang’s read-
ing, however, is that he locates this 
chinese modernity not so much in 
the institutional social organization 
of the song—whether positively or 
negatively compared to that of the 
West—as in the dialectic between 
that institutional transformation 
and the intellectual practice of song 
scholars that criticized their chang-
ing society. 
By excavating categories inter-
nal to those chinese traditions and 
putting them to historical work, 
Wang shows less a teleology of 
convergence than the historicity of 
song critical thought. in his intel-
lectual history as well as the essays 
in the Verso collection, Wang coun-
ters a universal progressive notion 
of world history and modernity 
with a “multi-interactive perspec-
tive” (84) in which modernity, in-
stead of a product of the West that 
inevitably came to transform the 
world into clones of Western capi-
talist modernity, was initially the 
varied production of interacting so-
cieties. it was only because of a set 
of very contingent causes that the 
Western model came to dominate. 
this implies that even today the 
Western capitalist model should 
not be taken as the inevitable end 
point of modernization. Wang’s 
work, therefore, aims to uncover 
how key Western categories came 
to be hegemonic in our discussion 
of modern chinese thought. For 
example, Wang argues that the em-
pire/nation-state dichotomy tells us 
more about Western thought—in 
which “the nation-state as the goal 
of history becomes a negation of the 
political form of empire in general” 
(126)—than it does about song 
china. What Wang is attempting 
to do is “to break down this dual-
ism, and to negate the dualistic 
relation as it appears in nineteenth-
century political economy” (126). 
Wang cautions, however, that 
this is not to say that . . . in-
digenous concepts can com-
pletely represent history: we 
must recognize that these 
endemic concepts also rep-
resent a particularistic nar-
rative or description in any 
given context. As a result, the 
particular ways of seeing that 
are opened up to us when we 
attach importance to history 
are very important in help-
ing us to identify the limita-
tions of our own ways of see-
ing. (124–25)
through the process, the history 
of modern chinese thought comes 
to be told as a story of intellectual 
critique, its institutionalization, 
and new cycles of critique;2 only by 
breaking from the hegemonic cat-
egories of Western thought and the 
powerful teleological narrative that 
they help construct can song his-
tory be given its proper historicity, 
and song thought again become a 
resource for critical engagement 
with modernity. 
this critical spirit is perhaps 
most fully articulated in Wang’s 
engagement with the revolutionary 
chinese writer Lu xun, the sub-
ject of the last chapter of the end 
of revolution (an introduction to 
a collection of political writings by 
Lu xun).3 Lu xun is a critical in-
tellectual for Wang because, while 
Lu xun criticized tradition, he did 
not simplistically oppose it with a 
progressive modernity to be found 
in the West. he was as critical of 
progress and modernity as he was 
of tradition (196): again, the dichot-
omy itself does not help us to make 
political and ethical decisions. 
Wang follows the Japanese thinker 
yoshimi takeuchi in noting the 
same cycle of critique and institu-
tionalization that Wang found in 
song history: 
For Lu xun, only “perma-
nent revolution” can break 
away from the never-ending 
repetition and cycle of his-
tory, and the one who main-
tains from beginning to end 
his “revolutionary” spirit will 
inevitably become the critic 
of his own comrades in the 
past, because the moment his 
comrades become satisfied 
with their “success” is the mo-
ment they will become mired 
in that historical cycle—it is 
this cycle that is the real revo-
lutionary’s ultimate target of 
revolution. (201)
critics must never, in other words, 
believe themselves to be outside of 
what they criticize—critique must 
always be self-reflexive (202). 
As Wang argues in chapter 
3, the long “interview concern-
ing modernity,” modernity is not 
a normative concept for him, but 
is “in itself paradoxical, contain-
ing intrinsic tensions and contra-
dictions” (75), and the critique 
of modernity arises from within 
144 ALexANder dAy
 oN WANg’s the end of the reVoLution 145
modernity itself. therefore, one 
cannot adopt “a holistic attitude 
towards modernity” (79), trans-
forming it into a seamless totality 
that one must either support or 
defeat. this separates Wang from 
both chinese postmodernists, 
who, as he notes, construct narra-
tives of a shift “from modernity to 
chinese” or “from modern to post-
modern” (79), and chinese liberal 
enlightenment scholars, whom he 
sees as arguing for a complete and 
uncritical adoption of Western 
capitalist modernity, for both treat 
modernity as a tensionless whole. 
in contrast, Wang argues that chi-
nese modernity since the colonial 
period should be characterized 
as an “anti-modern modernity”: 
china’s experience with Western 
modernity has always contained 
this contradictory tension—anti-
tradition, but also anti-imperialist 
and anticapitalist (79).4 Whereas 
the proponents of enlightenment 
tend to view the second, critical 
aspect as derailing the first—mod-
ernization—Wang argues that 
this “self-contradictory structure 
is the source of modernity’s self-
renewal” (79) and necessary to any 
project of social justice or equality. 
All the essays in the Verso col-
lection were published between 
1994 and 2007, during a period of 
time Wang calls “the Nineties.” 
Not consonant with the calendrical 
1990s, Wang’s “Nineties” cover the 
period from the 1989 democracy 
movement to the present, when 
the market came to dominate chi-
nese society. it denotes the end of 
both the revolutionary era—the 
“short twentieth century”—and 
the cold War. the 1980s, though 
clearly part of the reform period, 
were, according to Wang, “the 
final act of a revolutionary cen-
tury” (xi), for issues and debates of 
the 1980s “emerged from the his-
tory of socialism through the Fif-
ties, sixties and seventies” (xi–xii). 
With the end of revolution, “the 
Nineties,” by contrast, marked a 
new beginning—not the end of 
history—in which the key catego-
ries of the economy, politics, cul-
ture, and the military were trans-
formed. one of Wang’s criticisms 
of chinese liberalism is that it does 
not recognize this transformation 
and thus anachronistically utilizes 
categories across this historical 
divide as though their meanings 
were unchanged. “the Nineties” 
and their political categories have 
to be understood in relation to the 
rise of neoliberal globalization and 
the dominance of the market. Al-
though the essays in this collection 
do not focus on the revolutionary 
“short twentieth century,” they do 
begin to demarcate its ending just 
as Wang’s the rise of modern chi-
nese thought concerned the era 
before the revolutionary period. 
Wang states that it was through 
writing about the postrevolution-
ary period that he began to think 
more about the revolutionary pe-
riod itself. 
the first essay of the collection, 
“depoliticized politics: From east 
to West,” is the most direct and in-
novative in dealing with the “de-
revolutionary process” that defined 
the politics of the reform period (3). 
the main characteristic of post-
revolutionary politics is its depo-
liticization—an emptying out of 
political content to be replaced by a 
formalist politics. political institu-
tions and practices become simply 
a formal structure through which 
the market dominates society; the 
market, in turn, becomes the sub-
stantive content, while the social 
force of human collective action is 
formally restricted from politics. 
Wang holds that the tendency for 
depoliticization existed in china 
since the success of the revolution, 
although it was kept in check by 
the continuation of revolution-
ary politics. Bureaucratization and 
party power struggles constituted 
the main forms of depoliticization 
in the revolutionary period, and, 
launched to counter these tenden-
cies, Wang argues, the cultural 
revolution was an attempt at rev-
olutionary self-renewal. yet the 
cultural revolution, in particular 
through factionalization and politi-
cal repression, ended up leading to 
a further depoliticizing “rigidifica-
tion of the party-state” (4). public 
debate on “political values or strat-
egy” disappeared following the 
cultural revolution (6). As those 
who were attacked during that 
movement returned into power in 
the 1970s, they sought to repress 
political struggle in the name of 
party unity, rather than analyzing 
how political struggle “had degen-
erated into mere power play” (7)—
furthering the depoliticization of 
the party. 
At the same time, economics be-
came the focus of party work. here, 
the “party-state”—a state that was 
guided by the political values of a 
party—was replaced by a “state-
party,” in which the party loses its 
political values and social goals as 
it becomes but “a component of the 
state apparatus” (9). Wang follows 
italian sociologist Alessandro russo 
in noting that this statification of 
political parties has been a world-
wide phenomenon, true no less of 
Western-style multiparty repre-
sentative democracies than of the 
chinese communist party. Neolib-
eral market dominance has meant 
the formalization, statification 
and, ultimately, depoliticization of 
all political parties: the consolida-
tion of special interests has led to a 
“gradual disconnection of democ-
racy as a political structure from 
the basic units of society” (xxx). A 
linked process has been the profes-
sionalization of intellectuals and 
departmentalization of knowledge 
production: “since the university 
institution has as its premise pre-
cisely this particularization of the 
disintegration of knowledge, it has 
not reflected—and cannot possibly 
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be reflecting—on this social process 
in general, and on the problem of 
increasingly disintegrated knowl-
edge in particular” (207). 
in the end, depoliticization in-
sulates the market from democratic 
political intervention, and Wang’s 
project is a critique of the ideologi-
cal veils that naturalize this sepa-
ration by hiding the history of its 
implementation. chapter 2 of the 
collection, “the year 1989 and the 
historical roots of Neoliberalism 
in china,” clarifies the work that 
liberal ideology and neoliberal ide-
ology—the two are often treated 
as equivalent within chinese dis-
cussions, including Wang’s—does 
to cover the concrete and active 
process of integrating the chinese 
economy with global capitalism. 
the common use of the category 
“transition” to describe the reform 
period, for example, is an expres-
sion of neoliberal ideology, which 
operates to mask the contradictions 
of market economics—the grow-
ing gap between rich and poor, 
increasing unemployment, and 
the faltering social security system 
(19–20)—as if they were temporary 
problems of the shift. more impor-
tantly, the essay argues that the con-
dition for realizing chinese neolib-
eralism and the dominance of the 
market was the violent crackdown 
on the democracy movement of 
1989. Liberal narratives that view 
modernization in terms of an op-
position between the market as 
a spontaneous order—Friedrich 
hayek, a founding father of neo-
liberalism who was critical of state 
intervention into the market, has 
been quite influential for chinese 
liberals, and a target of critique for 
Wang—and the state conceal the 
active role of the chinese state in 
creating the conditions for market 
economics. As Wang states, 
neoliberalism, in truth, relies 
upon the strength of trans-
national and national poli-
cies and economies, and it 
depends upon a theory and 
discourse of economic for-
malism to establish its own 
hegemonic discourse. its 
extrapolitical and anti-state 
character is thus utterly de-
pendent upon its inherent 
links to the state. (19)
Wang argues that it was only 
through the state’s violent repres-
sion of the 1989 movement and the 
social forces that found political 
expression at the time that the full 
market reforms could be imple-
mented in the 1990s. 
Whereas liberal narratives focus 
on the role of students and intellec-
tuals in calling for formal democ-
racy during the 1989 movement, 
Wang notes the full range of social 
sectors that participated and the 
complexity of the movement. in 
this reading, the movement is un-
derstood as a response to new social 
contradictions that remain hidden 
within the cold War ideological 
framework of democracy/totalitar-
ianism. in polanyian terms, Wang 
states, 
As a movement for social 
self-preservation, the 1989 
social movement was inher-
ently a spontaneous protest 
against the proliferating in-
equalities spawned by mar-
ket expansion, and a critique 
of the state’s handling of 
the process of reform; as a 
movement of social protest, 
however, it also pursued a 
critique of authoritarianism 
and the methods of authori-
tarian rule. (30)
this is an important formulation 
for Wang, and it points to a major 
problem of chinese political dis-
course. often the New Left is criti-
cized for supporting the chinese 
communist party and not calling 
for democracy. But the problem is 
much more complex than this im-
plies: it is not a matter of whether 
one is for or against democracy, but 
how democracy gets defined and 
what its limits are. 
Wang has a very expansive idea 
of democracy. For Wang, and the 
New Left in general, democracy 
is not only a concept implying for-
mal elections, but must also include 
economic democracy: the ability of 
workers and the masses to influence 
the operation of economic entities 
such as enterprises, as well as to 
decide how social resources are to 
be used. this borrowing from the 
revolutionary period—Wang asks 
us to investigate what the “mass 
line or the popular democracy 
of this new era” is (xxxii)—runs 
counter to the separation of politics 
and economics that is the founda-
tion of the depoliticized politics 
of contemporary capitalism and 
neoliberal globalization. Likewise, 
politics is not just the realm of the 
state. repoliticization would mean 
“granting greater political capacity 
to mass society” (xxxii); democracy 
would mean finding new political 
forms through which to express 
social forces for equality. china has 
the advantage of a revolutionary 
history sensitive to social equality, 
but it also has powerful special in-
terests arrayed against repoliticiza-
tion, both within and outside the 
party. the party is in the process of 
being transformed into a depoliti-
cized representative of special in-
terests, losing the political values it 
was based upon, most importantly 
social equality. yet the party is still 
a site of political struggle, and this, 
too, separates the New Left from 
liberals—the state cannot simply be 
abandoned as a terrain of struggle 
for society. social forces need the 
state’s capacity to counter marketi-
zation and neoliberal globalization, 
just as the state needs social forces 
to maintain the political values 
that keep it from simply turning 
into a bureaucratic expression of 
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depoliticized special interests, an 
“empty form” without social con-
tent (xxx). 
one must ask why such an ex-
pansive discussion about the mean-
ing of democracy is usually inter-
preted as its reverse—as a threat 
to democracy—within contempo-
rary chinese intellectual discourse. 
here it is important to note that 
the cultural revolution remains a 
figure of chaos associated with un-
restrained social power for which 
the authoritarian state can become 
a vehicle—a fear of politics itself. 
in this understanding, protection 
must be sought in the formaliza-
tion of democracy and the insula-
tion of the economy from populist 
and state intervention. For the con-
temporary depoliticized state, this 
protection is expressed as a formal 
“rule by law”; for liberal intellectu-
als, it is based on individual rights 
anchored in naturalized property 
rights. Both are elitist formulations 
despite their surface opposition, for 
both attempt to limit collective so-
cial forces, limit active participation 
of the masses in politics and recon-
struction of the social order. 
it is through this liberal con-
figuration—authorized by the 
figure of cultural revolutionary 
violence—that Wang hui’s expan-
sive democracy is understood as its 
opposite, becoming an authoritari-
anism when the collective breaches 
proper, formal notions of property 
relations, or a dangerous populism 
when the masses transgress upon 
the individual. even opening such 
a discussion—or an investigation 
into the resources of the chinese 
revolutionary or prerevolutionary 
period—threatens the depoliticized 
politics of chinese intellectual in-
quiry. instead, liberal discourse ad-
heres to  universalization—china 
must follow the path of Western 
modernization—and naturaliza-
tion—the foundation of individual 
property rights is a natural human 
right. Wang hui’s very discus-
sion of social forces and expanded 
democracy—the inclusion of eco-
nomic democracy—contravenes 
these rules of depoliticized intellec-
tual discourse. 
in contemporary china, accord-
ing to Wang hui, repoliticization 
must be constructed around the 
category of equality. equality is a 
politicizing category because the 
naturalization of inequality is a 
foundation for the neutral, depo-
liticized neoliberal state that sim-
ply manages technical issues for 
the spontaneous development of 
the market. Wang points out that 
“class” played the role of politiciz-
ing category during the maoist pe-
riod. class was politicizing to the 
extent that it was a subjective, and 
not structural, concept. And this 
dichotomy suggests that Wang’s 
understanding of politics is far 
more Badiouian than marxist, in 
that he divorces the subjective from 
the structural instead of theoriz-
ing a link between the two. dur-
ing the maoist period, according 
to Wang, the concept of class “de-
noted the attitudes of social or po-
litical forces toward revolutionary 
politics, rather than the structural 
situation of social class” (10). thus, 
Wang does not seem to see a dia-
lectical relationship between the 
structural and subjective; instead, 
class becomes a purely subjective 
politics. in fact, moments in which 
class came to be understood as a 
structural identity were instances of 
depoliticization for Wang: the dis-
integration of the cultural revolu-
tion, for example. Wang, however, 
says little about why class can no 
longer play this politicizing role. 
in a related move, Wang does 
not discuss the political-economic 
shifts of “the Nineties” in terms 
of capitalism; instead, he tends to 
use the categories “globalization,” 
“the market,” and “neoliberalism.” 
this plays to Wang’s strengths: 
his primary goal is to critique the 
ideological obfuscation within the 
intellectual scene that conceals the 
political and economic transforma-
tions of contemporary china. in 
addition, Wang perhaps wants to 
avoid the political capitalism/so-
cialism dichotomy that so defined 
earlier chinese politics. yet at the 
same time this seems to trap Wang 
within the discourse of the 1980s 
and 1990s that he wants to escape, 
for the terms “globalization,” “the 
market,” and “neoliberalism” play 
a double role in Wang’s work: both 
as ideological categories to be cri-
tiqued and as categories used to 
name material and social processes 
themselves. A more direct confron-
tation with class and capitalism 
would seem warranted here. this 
problem is also tied to the issue of 
periodization: the 1980s fit uneas-
ily in Wang’s account. Are they the 
final scene of the revolutionary era 
or are they a full expression of post-
revolutionary depoliticized poli-
tics? this problem of periodization 
may reflect Wang’s own transfor-
mation on the issue and his increas-
ing concern with the revolution-
ary era, which has perhaps shifted 
his attention from 1989 towards 
the cultural revolution. Again, 
more attention to the relationship 
between the economic and the po-
litical—between structural changes 
and subjective politics—would be 
useful. 
Wang’s collection has implica-
tions beyond the field of china 
studies: it is a nuanced and highly 
theorized investigation into the re-
lationship between revolutionary 
traditions and the rise of neolib-
eral capitalism. unlike most other 
studies of reform-era china, which 
tend to view the era as a simple 
political break from maoism, the 
end of the revolution relates the 
politicization of the revolutionary 
period to the post-mao reforms in 
a complex way. the processes of 
politicization and depoliticization 
are bound up with the contradic-
tions of the revolution itself, and 
the bureaucratization of the revo-
lutionary state was the foundation 
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of post-mao neoliberal marketiza-
tion. Furthermore, Wang’s inno-
vative deconstruction of neoliberal 
ideology uncovers the often hidden 
linkage between depoliticizing au-
thoritarian states and the marketi-
zation of society, a process reiter-
ated around the world. perhaps 
most importantly, in envisioning an 
expanded democracy, Wang points 
to a way to repoliticize politics stra-
tegically and counter the forces of 
authoritarian marketization. 
Alexander day is Assistant Professor of 
history at Wayne state university, with 
a research focus on modern china. he is 
writing a book that examines contemporary 
debates on china’s emerging rural crisis and 
its relationship to intellectual politics in the 
reform era.
Notes
1. For more on the rise of modern 
chinese thought, see Viren murthy, 
“modernity Against modernity: Wang 
hui’s critical history of chinese 
thought,” modern intellectual history 
3, no. 1 (2006): 137–65; Ban Wang, 
“discovering enlightenment in 
chinese history: the rise of modern 
chinese thought,” boundary 2 34, no. 
2 (2007): 217–38; and Zhang yongle, 
“the Future of the past: on Wang 
hui’s rise of modern chinese thought,” 
New Left review 62 (march–April 
2010): 47–83. 
2. For a more detailed exposition on this 
point, see Zhang, “the Future of the 
past,” 80. 
3. Wang hui’s dissertation, later pub-
lished in chinese as “resisting despair,” 
is an innovative rereading of this 
important chinese intellectual, whom 
Wang sees as a model for contemporary 
intellectuals. see his fankang juewang: 
Lun Xun jiqi “nahan” “Panghuang” 
yanjiu [resisting despair] (shanghai: 
shanghai renmin chubanshe [shanghai 
people’s publishing house], 1991). 
4. Wang most famously developed this 
idea of “anti-modern modernity” in the 
essay “contemporary chinese thought 
and the Question of modernity” (see 
china’s new order: society, Politics, 
and economy in transition [cambridge, 
mA: harvard university press, 2003], 
139–87).
